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BOOK REVIEW
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789-1969: Their
Lives and Major Opinions. Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel, editors. New York: R. R. Bowker Company in association with Chelsea
House Publishers. 1969. 4 Volumes. Pp. 3373. $110.00.
Court and Constitution in the 20th Century: The Old Legality, 18891932. By William F. Swindler. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc. 1969. Pp. 458. $11.50.
Why constitutional history, so ancient and until quite recently a relatively neglected field of study, should now be enjoying a revival is not
hard to explain. The historian's quest is conditioned by the demands and
interests of the contemporary society, and there can be no doubt that the
activism of the Supreme Court over the past fifteen years has made it and
the document that it interprets a focal point of concern.
The new constitutional history must be different from that of the past,
for the country has changed dramatically over the last half-century, and
the questions that we now deem relevant and worthy of exploration are
ones that the old histories were not designed to answer. One tendency
of the new approach is to push the frontiers of the field outward to develop
a wider and more inclusive perspective. Another deals with methodology,
including the writer's willingness to experiment with psychological and
social observation and to probe more deeply beyond the who, what,
when, and where, and speculate upon the why. To determine how well
these new volumes meet the summons of the present is the task of this
review.
In four volumes, The Justices, edited by Leon Friedman and Fred
L. Israel, is obviously designed to fill a well-recgnized gap in our historical record, a gap that has existed, in part, because we have tended to
study the Supreme Court as an institution and its work as a group
product. Though the commanding personalities among the ninety-seven
men who have sat on the Supreme Court have not escaped attention, the
work of their associates has probably been obscured. While biographical
history is certainly as old as the discipline itself, probing and analytical
judicial biography is relatively new. Viewing law as a malleable cultural
product has led us to scrutinize more closely the work of the judge.
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Finally, we have begun to realize that the background, personality, predilections, and guiding assumptions of the men who sit on the bench
are powerful determinants of the law. For instance, Frankfurter called
for "penetrating studies" of the Justices, which he promised would illuminate not only the history of the Supreme Court but also the history of
the United States. Since the editors of The Justices quote these comments
in their preface, apparently they hoped that this composite work would
meet the demand for "penetrating studies." How well this demand is
met is the major question to be answered.
The editors and the publishers conceived of the work as reference
material, and the price of the set confirms this expectation. How well, then,
have the editors succeeded in their aim to fill a reference need? Editors
are like executives in that they are judged on their conceptual ideas and
on their success in obtaining others who can execute them well. The
basic scheme in The Justices was to gather a group of contributors
among whom to parcel the ninety-seven Justices of the Supreme Court,
including the eight now sitting, for the purpose of obtaining a biographical
essay evaluating each one, his background, his appointment, and his work
on the Court. In addition, each contributor was to select some opinions
of the Justice that would illustrate his work and ideas and then compile
a selected bibliography. To the editors' credit, the essays are generally
readable, considering that they often contain a considerable amount of
case discussion. The individual selection of opinions, which again to
the editors' credit are reported in full, can be questioned. For instance,
why is Iredell's opinion in Calder v. Bull' omitted, or why is Wiley
Rutledge's ringing dissent in the Yamashitc2 case left out? Though such
obvious omissions cannot be explained, the task here is fraught with
personal judgment, and generally the authors did an adequate job.
From a reference standpoint, the most serious deficiency of the
volumes is the lack of more complete bibliographies; and despite whatever problems their collaborators posed, the editors have the final responsibility. Since the essays are not footnoted, except in a few cases when
the disturbed author cited his source-material in parentheses, the bibliography becomes all the more essential. No one could reasonably expect
the citation of every piece of material that mentions a Justice, but when
Anthony Lewis can ignore his assignment by mentioning only a collection of Warren's speeches, the editors are not doing their job. The work
-3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798).
2

Inre Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1945) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
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would have been considerably strengthened by a general bibliography listting the useful books and articles that cut across the assignment of the
individual authors. Then an author could have briefly referred to the
more general works before listing the entries bearing specifically on the
Justice that he covered. Considering the comprehensive charts and statistical information, comprising eighty-nine pages of volume four, that
do provide useful reference material, the slighting of the bibliographical
task is extremely unfortunate.
If, with the exception of the bibliographical deficiency, the editors
conceived their project well, were they then able to choose the right
collaborators to carry out their scheme? The publicity blurb refers to
the work as the product of "38 distinguished scholars and historians."
In such a document some puffing is to be expected, but perhaps this characterization is more misleading than usual. Thirty of the Justices were
covered by four authors-the two editors; Frank Otto Gatell, the workhorse of the group; and David Burner. Their coverage is pedestrian and
totally uninspired. To compound the felony, Friedman is unmercifully
harsh in his condemnation of Whittaker; and Fred Israel, whose treatments are usually bland and sympathetic, fails to grasp the character
and contribution of Wiley Rutledge.
The editors did persuade a number of legal scholars to contribute
their services, but with surprising results. Paul A. Freund, seemingly
slighting the task and not the man, dashed off a seven-and-a-half page
essay of Holmes that in terms of coverage uncomfortably puts the Justice
in the company of John Blair, Jr., Thomas Todd, and Edward Terry
Sanford. Philip B. Kurland contributed a thirty-page. piece on Robert
Jackson that consists primarily of excerpts drawn from interviews with
Jackson prepared for The Oral History Project of Columbia University.
Though the hitherto unpublished material is interesting, it hardly qualifies as an historical assessment of the man. In contrast, Norman Dorsen
contributed a good effort on the present John Marshall Harlan, and
Andrew Kaufman, who has long been working on a biography of Cardozo,
served that Justice well.
The political scientists among the contributors were more uniformly
in tune with the task and worked fairly well from previously-established
research bases. One could quarrel with the particular emphases of the
authors and their treading of now familiar paths, but Alfred Thomas
Mason's essays on Brandeis, Taft and Stone; C. Herman Pritchett's
contribution on Reed; and Donald Morgan's on William Johnson are
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authoritative. Moving beyond the good summation and solid research
base are the essays of Robert G. McCloskey on James Wilson and Field.
In both pieces the author places the subject in bold perspective and
provides that level of interpretation and analysis lacking in the collection
as a whole.
Despite advance publicity that tried to sell the work as one done
from many perspectives-that of the lawyer, the legal scholar, the political
scientist, and the journalist-the task, in essence, makes them all historians; so the fact that the majority of Justices are covered by professional historians is not surprising. What is surprising is that the
editors did not use greater care and judgment in their selection of contributors. The best essays done by an historian are the four by Arnold
Paul, a respected constitutional specialist. Though assigned none of the
leading figures of the Court, he brought keen judgment, perspective,
and analysis to his treatment of Blatchford, L. Q. C. Lamar, Brewer, and
Shiras and the roles that they played. What is more, he asks the question,
why? Too rarely throughout the entire collection is that question raised.
Herbert Alan Johnson, one of the editors of the Marshall Papers,
did contribute an interesting essay on the great Chief Justice. Even if his
suggestion that Marshall's continued role as spokesman for the Court
from the mid-1820's on was due to his basic identification with the policies
and views of the Jeffersonian Republicans is not entirely convincing,
Johnson at least had the courage to venture out on an interpretive limb.
The essay is better for it. To be fair, a few of the other historians among
the contributors did seek to develop some perspective and interpret the
material, but their success was limited.
Two non-academicians whose work should be mentioned are Gerald T.
Dunne and John P. Frank. Dunne, covering Livingston, Story, and
Thompson, ran into some problems of organization, but the pieces reveal
an understanding of the law of the period that make them stand out.
Frank, who has done a considerable amount of writing about the Court
in recent years, gave Douglas and Black-though not Murphy-the most
human treatment in the collection.
Finally, the work of two journalists, Anthony Lewis on Warren and
John P. MacKenzie on Burger, adds some flavor to the collection. Lewis'
treatment of Warren's background and appointment to the Court is
sketchy and insufficient, but his evaluation of the man, as a statesman
motivated by a strong, old-fashioned, generally expansive sense of justice
and unencumbered by a vested interest in the law as he found it, seems
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sound. Another exercise into contemporary history is the rather lengthy
but fascinating study that centers on Warren Burger's succession to
the Chief Justiceship. Burger's background both off and on the bench
is fairly well handled, but the true worth of the piece is found in the
fairly extensive report of President Nixon's informal meeting with reporters prior to the announcement of the appointment.
Though there are bright spots in the collection of ninety-seven essays,
the total effort is disappointing. There are no new departures, and there
is too little refinement in biographical analysis. The only psychological
observations found in the entire work are those made by Paul in his
discussion of L. Q. C. Lamar, which provide the reader with new insight
into the man. Whether the biographer wants to play psychologist is no
longer an open question; the psychological dimension can only be ignored
at the author's peril. That it will not always be possible to form opinions
on the material available is to be expected, but look at the opportunity
Friedman missed in his treatment of Bradley.
Friedman tells the following story, which is in the literature on
Bradley. At his wife's insistence, Bradley was persuaded to change his
trousers before leaving for the railway station. By the time he got to
the depot, the train had departed. He returned home where his wife discovered him ripping the trousers to shreds with his penknife and mumbling,
"You will never compel me to miss another train." Friedman, in his
favorable evaluation, cites the story only as evidence that Bradley was
an irascible man who brooked no interference in his affairs.
Material such as this is available, but its relevance and meaning must
be probed. In most cases the authors failed to be challenged by their
task, to find some approach that would add a dimension of significance
to what some acknowledged was a dreary responsibility. Recognizing that
many of its members have contributed little, some critics might questiorm
the essential worth of covering each one of the ninety-seven men who
have sat on the Court; but I have no quarrel with the idea, just its execution. There is too little analysis and interpretation, and what appears
is often uncritically drawn from available secondary sources. Few authors
were without source-material of a primary nature, including a Justice's
opinions or even the opinions to which he subscribed, but too often the
authors bemoaned the absence of other material and missed the opportunity
to find and then mine what was available. Though the composite effect
of the essays is to produce an unorthodox constitutional history, the effort
contains few surprises. The relevance of a Justice's background to his

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48

judicial career is rarely contended with, and labels tend to substitute for
analysis. Frankfurter's plea for "penetrating studies" remains unfulfilled,
and though some may question how well it could possibly have been met
by short biographical essays, the apparent conclusion is that this work could
have come closer to that goal. Unfortunately, the work does not support
well its implied thesis that Supreme Court history has been distorted by
our focus on only a small percentage of the Court's membership.
The editors left the task of summarizing to Albert P. Blaustein and
Roy M. Mersky, who are responsible for the appendix entitled "The
Statistics on the Supreme Court," which contains four charts and two
tables. Chart III consists of two graphs representing the average age
of Justices and their average length of service. The other three charts
list the Justices according to appointment, seat number, and alphabetical
order. Other information is collated in these three charts, including the
position that each Justice left for service on the Supreme Court. Table I
lists the acts of Congress held unconstitutional by the Court through
June, 1969, and Table II lists the decisions of the Court that have been
overruled by a later Court. Introducing the charts and tables are fifteen
pages of commentary that provide a limited summary of the work.
In conclusion, Friedman and Israel have provided a convenient set
of biographical essays, generally reliable as to the data included, and
useful statistical materal that has some reference value. It is unfortunate,
however, that so much time, effort, and money was expended without
greater benefit to our understanding of Supreme Court history.
While Friedman and Israel miss the mark of bringing their grandiose
work up to the sophisticated level that should, and only partially does,
characterize constitutional studies, William F. Swindler in the first published volume of his two-part study succeeds admirably well. In this
volume, subtitled "The Old Legality, 1889-1932," he explores a period
that has received little concentrated attention by constitutional historians.
What he has attempted is really quite ambitious, for he works from the
correct assumption that to focus on the work of the Supreme Court exclusively is insufficient in rendering constitutional history. Swindler discusses most of the significant cases of the Supreme Court in the period,
and they are placed in a useful-if at times somewhat overblown-political,
economic, and, to a lesser extent, social context. The book, perhaps, could
be characterized as a political history of the period with special emphasis
on the particular factors that have constitutional significance. What is
even more surprising is that the author has constructed a narrative of
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considerable appeal. The book is generally well written, with case names
often relegated to the notes at the back of the book, and the errors that
find their way into print are minor.
In three hundred pages of closely-printed type, Swindler has told his
story well, but there are certain problems in his book. At times the inclusion of historical material seems to serve as a substitute for analysis
and explanation. While not always true, I suspect that this weakness
results from a legal scholar learning his history so well that it has crowded
out the careful delineation of his thesis.
The analytical problem lies in the area of making the theme of the
book ring true, making it more meaningful in itself rather than as a foil
to the companion volume. The period covered by Swindler is a complex
one and labeling it "The Old Legality," even in the perspective of the
total eighty years to be covered by the two volumes, leads to the minimizing of the more liberal currents at work on the bench. Hammer v.
Dagenhart in 1918 comes as such a surprise only because the Court
departed from its reading of the commerce clause as a grant of the police
power to the federal government. There is no coordinated discussion
of the decisions on this point, and, although the author does recognize
some liberality in the Court's decisions in the early Twentieth Century,
he does not do full justice to the complexity of the so-called Progressive
Era. The total effect is to further rather than undermine the generalizations that have passed for analyses of the Court's attitude and response
to the reform-minded society. The book is weak in that it fails to closely
and analytically inspect the total work of the Court. As the author
promises in his foreword, he tends to leave the development of the
constitutional argument to the members of the Court, whose opinions he
summarizes.
Despite these reservations, I was impressed with a number of contributions that the author makes to the study of constitutional history.
Much work remains to be done in the constitutional history of the fortythree years covered, and the most that any author can hope for is that, as
he moves into largely virgin territory, he contributes to how the study
should be approached and to our understanding of the period. From this
perspective, Swindler's book is quite successful.
First, Swindler has become the first constitutional historian to emphasize consistently the crucial importance of the offices of AttorneyGeneral and Solicitor-General in the development of our constitutional
-247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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law. Now that the emphasis is placed, it seems quite obvious; yet, except
in isolated instances or in particularized discussions of cases, no one
else has emphasized this importance before. Swindler is especially effective
in interweaving the personnel of the Justice Department into the story of
the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
Second, Swindler seems more sensitive than previous writers not
only to the interaction between Congress and the Supreme Court but also,
though he never states it in these terms, to the role of Congress as a
primary interpreter of the Constitution through acts of legislation and
the consideration of amendments.
Third, Swindler has dealt directly and analytically with the amending
process as an indispensable facet of our constitutional history. Other
writers have mentioned amendments, their proposal, their content, and
their ratification; but there has been remarkably little analysis of the
constitutional questions that have been raised about the process itself,
the permissible content of amendments, and their relationship to other
provisions of the Constitution. Illustrative of the value of this longoverdue approach is the excellent chapter Swindler entitles "Prohibition:
A Socio-Legal Sketch."
In addition to these contributions to the enrichment of the field of
constitutional history, Swindler does sprinkle a number of perceptive
passages throughout the book. The following is an example:
McReynolds and his coalition of change-resisting colleagues insisted upon denying to the states the power to reform the existing economic system. In thus stunting the growth of state power, the conservatives permitted the problem to grow instead, until at a future

date it attained such proportions that only a national power could
cope with it.4
This passage makes good sense; the liberal may indeed face the future
with too much optimism, but the conservative, who conjures up horrors
as he contemplates the future, tends, by obstructing and delaying change,
to make the nightmare more likely. Swindler's proposition that the
states were willing and able to undertake fundamental reform of their
economic systems is debatable, but perhaps the conservatives were, in
reality, more responsible for the growth of our national government than

were the liberals with their approving ideology.
'W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE OLD
LEGALITY, 1889-1932, at 218 (1969).
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Swindler's book, in addition to its index and adequate, but not impressive, bibliography, contains five appendices. The first gives brief
biographical facts about the Justices, the Solicitors-General, and AttorneysGeneral of the period. Appendix B lists proposed constitutional amendments from 1889 to 1932. The third appendix contains brief descriptions
of statutes dealing with the federal judiciary, and the fourth contains
similar descriptions of selected congressional acts and a scorecard of
the Court's record in invalidating legislation and in overruling earlier
decisions. Appendix E covers chronologically the principal constitutional cases decided by the Court during the period, along with a
running record of changes on the Court and in the Justice Department.
This material adds a useful dimension to the book, as do the charts of
the Supreme Court that precede each of three major sections in the text.
I heartily recommend this first volume of Court and Constitution in
the 20th Century to all lawyers with some interest in history, and I await
with anticipation the appearance of Swindler's second and concluding
volume.
JOHN E. SEMONCHE

Associate Professor of History and Lecturer in Law
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

F

HERBERT RALPH BAER

This issue of the North Carolina Law Review is dedicated to Alumni
Distinguished Professor of Law Herbert R. Baer, who is retiring this
month after twenty-six years at the Law School.
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